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Abstract In 2009 Dutch judges convicted several minors
for theft of virtual items in the virtual worlds of online
multiplayer computer games. From a legal point of view
these convictions gave rise to the question whether virtual
items should count as ‘‘objects’’ that can be ‘‘stolen’’ under
criminal law. This legal question has both an ontological
and a moral component. The question whether or not vir-
tual items count as ‘‘objects’’ that can be ‘‘stolen’’ is an
ontological question. The question whether or not they
should count as such under criminal law is of a moral
nature. The purpose of this paper is to answer both the
ontological question and the moral question underlying the
legal question.
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Introduction
In 2009 Dutch judges convicted three minors of theft for
the stealing of virtual furniture in the virtual world of the
online multiplayer computer game Habbo (Rechtbank
Amsterdam, 2 April 2009, LJN: BH9789, BH9790,
BH9791). Habbo consists of a virtual hotel where players
have their own room, which they can furnish. By means of
deceit the perpetrators obtained the usernames and pass-
words of other Habbo players, so that they could access the
other players’ accounts and transfer their virtual furniture
to their own Habbo accounts.
In a similar case, two minors were convicted of theft for
stealing a virtual amulet and a virtual mask in the virtual
world of the online multiplayer computer game RuneScape
(Gerechtshof Leeuwarden, 10 November 2009, LJN:
BK2773, BK2764). RuneScape is a virtual medieval fan-
tasy realm in which players earn points and items, such as
the aforementioned amulet and mask, through their activ-
ities in the realm. The perpetrators had violently forced
another player of RuneScape to give them access to his
account, so that they could transfer his virtual amulet and
virtual mask to their own RuneScape accounts. The highest
court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) will decide on the
RuneScape case, but the decision is still pending.
From a legal point of view the RuneScape and the Habbo
cases raise the question whether virtual items, such as a
virtual mask, a virtual amulet and virtual furniture, should
count as ‘‘objects’’ that can be ‘‘stolen’’ under criminal law
(Hoekman and Dirkzwager 2009, p. 158). This legal question
has both an ontological and a moral component. The question
whether or not virtual items count as ‘‘objects’’ that can be
‘‘stolen’’ is an ontological question. As will be explained
below, the question whether or not they should count as such
under criminal law is largely of a moral nature.
In liberal societies the criminal law is seen as a last
resort. Since the punishments of the criminal law, e.g.
deprivation of liberty, represent grave infringements of the
fundamental rights of persons, it is only considered justi-
fied to apply the criminal law if no less intrusive alterna-
tives seem reasonable (Murphy and Coleman 1990,
pp. 109–110). Although legal policy considerations might
also play a role, the decision whether it is reasonable to
apply the criminal law or a less intrusive alternative is
mainly based on moral grounds. In essence, it is only
morally appropriate to use criminal law to control the
infliction of harm within society (Brenner 2008, p. 5).
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Lawyers have extensively debated the legal question
raised by the RuneScape and Habbo cases, in- as well as
outside the Netherlands (e.g. Hoekman and Dirkzwager
2009; Moszkowicz 2009; Rijna 2010; Brenner 2008; Kerr
2008). The purpose of this paper is to answer both the
ontological question and the moral question underlying
the legal question. In this way I hope also to contribute to the
legal debate; for I think that the answers to these questions
are relevant for the ultimate answer to the legal question. My
main aim, however, is to put the issue of theft of virtual items
on the agenda of computer ethics, because I think that it is in
need of further discussion and analysis by scholars in this
field. I hope this paper provides a fruitful starting point.
I will begin with the ontological question. I hold that the
act of stealing in the virtual world of an online multiplayer
computer game can be seen as a ‘‘real institutional activ-
ity’’ and virtual items as ‘‘requisite objects’’ if they have
the features that make it sensible to see them as such (Brey
2003, pp. 278–279). Applying Searle’s ‘‘constitutive rule’’
(Searle 1995, pp. 28, 46), it can be said that the act of
stealing in the virtual world of an online multiplayer
computer game (X) counts as theft (Y) in the non-virtual
world (C). Thereby, it is admitted that virtual items (X),
count as ‘‘objects that can be stolen’’ (Y) in the non-virtual
world (C). Ultimately, I come to the conclusion that it also
makes sense, from a moral point of view, to count the act
of stealing virtual items in the virtual world of an online
multiplayer computer game as theft and, thereby, virtual
items as ‘‘objects’’ that can be ‘‘stolen’’ if these virtual
items can be considered property with (pecuniary or
hedonistic) value in the non-virtual world. If so, the act of
stealing them harms: it makes the owner worse off in a way
which affects his well-being. It is widely accepted that,
from a moral point of view, it is legitimate to bring an act
under the scope of a penal norm if it is harmful to others
(Mill 1865, p. 6).
Ontology in the virtual worlds of computer games
The virtual entities encountered in the virtual worlds of
online multiplayer computer games such as Habbo or
RuneScape can be divided into two main categories. These
virtual entities can be representations of real entities; in the
virtual world of a computer game one can, for instance,
encounter a virtual chair or a virtual car. One might also
encounter virtual entities that do not have a real, non-vir-
tual counterpart, such as a virtual dragon or a virtual
gnome. These entities are not only virtual; they are also
fictitious. According to Brey the first category of virtual
entities, the representations of real entities, can be further
categorized as follows. He thinks that they are either ‘‘mere
simulations of real-world entities’’ or ‘‘genuine ontological
reproductions, recognized as part of reality’’ (Brey 2003,
p. 282).
The virtual representations of real entities that have
certain essential physical properties, such as mass, are mere
simulations. The virtual counterparts of such real entities
are not recognized as part of reality, because computers are
evidently ‘‘not able to reproduce their essential physical
properties’’ (Brey 2003, pp. 277–278). Consider the fol-
lowing example. Although producer Polyphony claims that
its new computer game Gran Turismo 5 provides a real
driving experience (http://www.gran-turismo.com), driving
a car through the mountains in the virtual world of Gran
Turismo 5 is not normally interpreted as a real experience,
but as a mere simulation, because computers are not able to
reproduce the essential physical properties of a car (e.g. the
mass) and mountains (e.g. the height). The virtual repre-
sentations of real ‘‘institutional’’ entities can be genuine
ontological reproductions, recognized as part of reality.
Below, it will be explained what institutional entities are
and why they can be adequately ontologically reproduced
in virtual environments.
The concept of institutional entities derives from Searle.
By institutional entities Searle means entities on which
some ‘‘status function’’ has been imposed (Searle 1995,
pp. 14, 27–29). Status functions are imposed when people
collectively assign a status to an entity. The collective
assignment of status results in an agreement, which has the
form of the following ‘‘constitutive rule’’: ‘‘X counts as Y
in context C’’ (Searle 1995, p. 28). Here, X defines the
entity that is assigned a status, Y defines the status that is
assigned and C defines the context in which this status
holds. Money is a good example of an institutional entity.
We have collectively agreed, for instance, that the Euro
(X) counts as a legal tender (Y) in certain EU member-
countries, which are collectively known as the ‘‘Eurozone’’
(C).
As Brey points out, institutional entities can be ade-
quately ontologically reproduced in virtual worlds, because
they usually do not need to have physical properties of the
kind that cannot be reproduced by computers. ‘‘In princi-
ple, any status function can be assigned to anything, if only
there is the collective will to do it’’ (Brey 2003, p. 278).
However, in practice, people will only assign status func-
tions to entities that have the features that make it sensible
to do that (Ibid.).
According to Brey many real institutional entities are
ontologically reproduced in virtual environments nowa-
days, because there are ‘‘many virtual entities that lend
themselves well to the meaningful assignment of status
functions’’ (2003, pp. 278–279). He divides the virtual
counterparts of real institutional entities into two catego-
ries: ‘‘real institutional activities’’ and ‘‘requisite objects’’
(Ibid.). Online gambling is an example of a real
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institutional activity; a virtual slot machine is an example
of the requisite object. The act of online gambling on a
virtual slot machine (X) counts as gambling (Y) in the non-
virtual world (C), or at least it makes sense to count it as
such if one can really win or lose money.
Yet the question arises as to which category the virtual
mask, virtual amulet and virtual furniture that were at stake
in the RuneScape and Habbo cases belong. These virtual
entities are not fictitious; they are representations of real
entities. At first glance one would say that they belong to
the subcategory of virtual entities that are mere simulations
of real entities, because computers are evidently not able to
ontologically reproduce the essential physical properties of
furniture, a mask or an amulet, such as their mass. If one
looks at them from a legal perspective, however, one can
argue that the virtual mask, virtual amulet and virtual
furniture that were at stake in the RuneScape and Habbo
cases are genuine ontological reproductions, recognized as
part of (institutional) reality. The judges in these cases
seem to have assumed that the act of stealing in the virtual
world of RuneScape or Habbo is a real institutional
activity. In line with Searle’s ‘‘constitutive rule’’ they have
recognized that the act of stealing in the virtual world of
these online multiplayer computer games (X) counts as
theft (Y) in the non-virtual world (C). They have, thereby,
also recognized that the requisite objects, a virtual mask,
virtual amulet and virtual furniture (X), count as ‘‘objects
that can be stolen’’ (Y) in the non-virtual world (C).
As mentioned earlier, Brey claims that status functions
are usually only assigned to virtual entities that have the
features that make it sensible to do that (2003, p. 278). The
Habbo and RuneScape cases raise the question whether it
makes sense to see the act of stealing in the virtual world of
an online multiplayer computer game as the real (onto-
logically reproduced) institutional activity of theft and
virtual items as requisite objects (objects that can be sto-
len). Answering these questions will be the aim of the
following sections.
Stealing in the virtual world of an online multiplayer
computer game, real theft?
I will start with the question whether it makes sense to see
the act of stealing in the virtual world of an online multi-
player computer game as the real institutional activity of
theft. As was briefly mentioned in the introduction, it is
mainly decided on the basis of moral grounds whether it is
reasonable to bring an act under the scope of a penal norm
or not. Therefore, I will examine the aforementioned
question from a moral point of view. In order to gain as
broad a picture as possible, I will make use of different
models of moral reasoning.
At first glance, the ‘‘top-down model’’ of moral rea-
soning seems the best way to find the answer to the
question at stake. In a top-down model of moral reasoning
it is established whether a new, particular situation falls
under a general rule. A general rule can for instance consist
of a principle, a norm or an ideal (Beauchamp 2003, p. 7).
In this case, it needs to be established whether the act of
stealing in the virtual world of an online multiplayer
computer game falls under the prohibition of theft, which is
a (penal) norm.
Many lawyers argue that (criminal) law should not be
applied to the virtual worlds of computer games (e.g.
Brenner 2008; Kerr 2008; Moszkowicz 2009; Rijna 2010).
They think that there is a kind of metaphorical line, a
‘‘magic circle’’, between the fantasy realms of the virtual
worlds of computer games and the non-virtual world
(Fairfield 2009, p. 824; Salen and Zimmerman 2004,
pp. 93–100). The concept of the magic circle originally
derives from the Dutch philosopher Huizinga (1950
[1938]). The thrust of the magic circle is that conduct that
is performed in a (computer) game setting is not real and
can therefore not be sanctioned by real law (Fairfield 2009,
p. 825).
There does indeed seem to be a magic circle. In the
virtual worlds of computer games players often act out
scenarios that would fall under a penal norm if performed
in the non-virtual world (Fairfield 2009, p. 826). In the
virtual world of the computer game Grand Theft Auto, for
instance, players can kill policemen (http://www.rock
stargames.com/ grandtheftauto). An actual murder charge
has never been brought against a player who killed a
policeman in Grand Theft Auto, however.
The magic circle can be explained as follows. The vir-
tual worlds of computer games are, usually, governed by
the rules of the game. Some of them, e.g. Habbo and
RuneScape, are governed by ‘‘formally generated rules’’,
which are set by the company that owns and operates the
computer game and to which players have to agree before
they can play the game. The virtual worlds of other com-
puter games, e.g. Second Life, are governed by ‘‘informally
generated rules’’, which are agreed upon by players
themselves (Fairfield 2009, pp. 831–832). As long as
players act out scenarios that fall under the scope of these
rules, there is no room for legal regulation (Ibid., p. 826).
An undesirable act can then be sanctioned by a punishment
set by the company that owns and operates the computer
game or a punishment on which the players have collec-
tively agreed. On the other hand, if a player acts out a
scenario that does not fall under the scope of the (formally
or informally generated) rules of the game, the metaphor-
ical line of the magic circle is crossed and the act might,
therefore, be subjected to (penal) law instead (Ibid.,
pp. 831–832).
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Computer games can be compared to sports, such as
soccer, with regard to this matter. During a soccer game
players often perform acts, such as kicking an opponent
player, that would fall under a penal norm (e.g. battery) if
performed in a different context. In the context of a soccer
game, however, the aforementioned behaviour will usually
be governed by the rules of the game and the player will,
for instance, be shown a yellow or a red card. But, as the
following example shows, an act performed during a soccer
game can exceed the rules of the game and, therefore, be
subjected to penal law instead. In 2004 a Dutch soccer
player committed a foul on an opponent player and thereby
caused his leg to break in several places. He was convicted
of battery under criminal law (Hoge Raad, 22 April 2008,
LJN: BB7087). The judges in this case established that
there are two types of situation in which an act performed
in a game context does not fall under the scope of the rules
of the game. First of all, an act can constitute such a grave
violation of the rules of the game that they do not provide
an adequate punishment. Secondly, an act can be (partly)
performed outside the game setting (Hoge Raad, 22 April
2008, LJN: BB7087, § 4.5).
The first type of situation was at stake in the case at
hand: even the most severe punishments of the soccer rules,
penalty and expulsion, are not proportional to a compound
leg fracture. This type of situation could also occur in the
context of an online multiplayer computer game. Consider
the following example. Some online multiplayer computer
games, e.g. Habbo and RuneScape, provide a chat inter-
face. Generally, the rules of these computer games prohibit
the use of racist language. Players who break this rule face
a penalty, usually in the form of a (temporary) ban or mute
(http://www.runescape.com, http://www.habbo.nl; http://
www.habbo.com). But if a player uses racist language
that is found to be so offensive that a (temporary) ban or
mute is not considered to be a proportional punishment, a
penal norm, e.g. the prohibition on hate speech, might be
applied instead.
As the judges in these cases explain, the second type of
situation was at stake in the Habbo and RuneScape cases
(Rechtbank Amsterdam, 2 April 2009, LJN: BH9789,
BH9790, BH9791; Gerechtshof Leeuwarden, 10 November
2009, LJN: BK2773, BK2764). The acts of stealing in
Habbo and RuneScape were partly performed outside the
setting of these games, because they involved out of the
game infractions. In the Habbo case, the act of stealing was
accomplished through out of the game deceit. The perpe-
trators had used phishing techniques to create a false
website and to trick other players of Habbo into providing
their usernames and passwords, so that they could access
the other players’ accounts and transfer their virtual fur-
niture to their own Habbo accounts (Rechtbank Amster-
dam, 2 April 2009, LJN: BH9789, BH9790, BH9791). In
the RuneScape case, the act of stealing was accomplished
through a physical confrontation in the non-virtual world.
The perpetrators had violently forced their victim to give
them access to his account so that they could transfer the
virtual amulet and virtual mask to their own accounts. They
had hit and kicked him and threatened him with a knife
(Gerechtshof Leeuwarden, 10 November 2009, LJN:
BK2773, BK2764).
The determination that an act in the virtual world of an
online multiplayer computer game does not fall under the
scope of the rules of the game and, therefore, crosses the
metaphorical line of the magic circle is a necessary, but not
a sufficient condition to subject this act to penal law. For
the purpose of applying the criminal law it is also important
whether the act caused harm. For it is widely accepted that
an act should only be brought under the scope of a penal
norm if it falls under John Stuart Mill’s ‘‘harm principle’’
(Steel 2008, p. 716). The harm principle entails ‘‘(…) that
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilised community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others’’ (Mill 1865, p. 6).
It is important to note that online multiplayer computer
games involve ‘‘networked computers and multiple users’’
(Allen 2010, p. 232). Therefore, it is possible that the act of
one player has a real impact on another player or other
players, albeit through the computer-mediated world of the
game (Fairfield 2009, p. 825). Yet the question arises
whether this real impact can consist of harm. It is not
entirely clear what harm entails however. This problem
often occurs in top-down reasoning: in hard cases moral
judgments usually require that we make the general rules
(norms, principles or ideals) themselves more specific
(Beauchamp 2003, p. 8).
The notion of harm can be specified as follows. Raz
claims that ‘‘roughly speaking, one harms another when
one’s action makes the other person worse off than he was,
or is entitled to be, in a way which affects his future well-
being’’ (1986, p. 414). Following Raz harm can, for the
purposes of the harm principle, be defined as a setback to a
morally justifiable (legal) interest (Steel 2008, p. 732). A
(legal) interest is considered to be morally justifiable under
this definition if a setback to the interest makes a person
worse off, in a way which affects his or her well-being.
Does the act of stealing in the virtual world of an online
multiplayer computer game cause a setback to a morally
justifiable (legal) interest? In order to answer this question
it helps to reason the other way around; to take the case as a
starting point instead of the general norm or principle. This
way of moral reasoning is called bottom-up reasoning. It
works as follows. Bottom-up models of moral reasoning
include several distinct methodologies, of which casuistry
(case-based reasoning) is the most used (Beauchamp 2003,
p. 8). In case-based reasoning, the new, particular situation
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is compared to one or more cases to which the general rule
does or does not apply (Søraker 2007, p. 342). If the new,
particular situation is relevantly similar to the paradigmatic
case(s), it should be treated in a similar manner; if it is
relevantly different, it should be treated differently (Ibid.).
This method of moral reasoning has much in common with
legal case-based reasoning (case-law): the decision of a
court can be authoritative for other courts hearing cases
with similar facts (Beauchamp 2003, p. 9).
Real-life cases in which theft is widely acknowledged as
such generally constitute a violation of the property rights
of the property owner, which is a setback to legal interests
(Stewart 2010, p. 20). Property rights can be seen as
morally justifiable legal interests, because a setback to
these interests ‘‘attack[s] one’s entire personal well-being,
by attacking the welfare interests necessary to it’’ (Fein-
berg 1984, p. 62). This can be explained as follows.
According to the prevalent common-sense conception of
well-being, wealth is conducive to well-being (Søraker
2010, p. 263). Property, or at least valuable property, is
conducive to wealth. So, a violation of property rights
makes a person worse off in a way which affects his or her
well-being, because it causes a set-back to his or her
wealth. The key harm that is caused by theft is pecuniary
loss (Steel 2008, p. 736).
The act of stealing virtual items in the virtual world of
an online multiplayer computer game will thus be rele-
vantly similar to real-life cases in which theft is widely
acknowledged as such if these virtual items are valuable
property, and it will be relevantly different if they are not.
Apparently, it is a necessary requirement for an act of
stealing to fall under the prohibition on theft that the
object(s) stolen is/are valuable property. It is here that we
encounter the reconciliation of top-down and bottom-up
reasoning. If we focus on the necessary requirement that
the case has to meet in order to fall under the scope of the
general rule, we neither take the case nor the general rule as
a starting point for our moral reasoning. This way of rea-
soning is called the ‘‘coherence method’’ (Beauchamp
2003, p. 10). The coherence method enables us to shift
back and forth between the general rule and the case via the
necessary requirement until they fit each other (Søraker
2007, p. 345).
Yet we can come to the preliminary conclusion that it
makes sense, from a moral point of view, to bring the act of
stealing virtual items in the virtual world of an online
multiplayer computer game under the prohibition on theft
if these virtual items count as valuable property in the non-
virtual world. In the next section it will be established
whether virtual items can meet this necessary requirement.
It should be noted that, thereby, we do not only reach a
final conclusion on the question whether it makes sense,
from a moral point of view, to see the act of stealing in the
virtual world of an online multiplayer computer game as
theft, but we will also establish whether it makes sense,
from a moral point of view, to see virtual items as requisite
objects of theft (objects that can be stolen).
Virtual items: real property, real value?
In this section it will first be established whether virtual
items can count as real property in the non-virtual world.
Then, it will be established whether they represent real
value in the non-virtual world.
At first glance, one would say that virtual items in the
virtual world of an online multiplayer computer game are
the property of the company that owns and operates
the game. The terms of service (ToS) of most online
multiplayer computer games, e.g. those of Habbo and
RuneScape, state that all items in the game are the (intel-
lectual) property of the company that owns and operates
the game. This determination does not enable us to bring
the act of stealing virtual items in the virtual world of the
online multiplayer computer game under the scope of the
prohibition of theft, however. After all, when one player
steals virtual items from another player within the virtual
world of an online multiplayer computer game, the prop-
erty rights of the company that owns and operates the game
remain unviolated.
Therefore, the necessary requirement that the act of
stealing virtual items in the virtual world of an online
multiplayer computer game has to meet in order to fall
under the scope of the prohibition on theft needs to be
refined. If it can be established that virtual items in the
virtual world of an online multiplayer computer game also
count as a particular player’s (valuable) property in the
non-virtual world, the act of stealing them in the virtual
world of the computer game constitutes a violation of this
player’s property rights and it thus makes sense to bring
this act under the prohibition on theft. Can virtual items
count as a particular player’s property in the non-virtual
world? Before answering this question it should be noted
that the fact that virtual items in the virtual world of an
online multiplayer computer game are formally owned by
the company that owns and operates the computer game, is
not an obstacle to consider them also (valuable) property of
a player in the non-virtual world, for the purpose of
applying the criminal law (Gerechtshof Leeuwarden, 10
November 2009, LJN: BK2773, BK2764).
(Private) property can be defined as a system that allo-
cates particular objects to particular persons, to the exclu-
sion of others (Waldron 2004, introduction). An object is
allocated to a person if some past event of appropriation
has established that person as the owner. The past event of
appropriation can, for instance, consist of the effort that
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has been put into acquiring the property. In his famous Two
Treatises of Government Locke stated:
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his
labour with, and joined to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property.
(Locke 2007 [1689], p. 30, sec. 27)
But, as Hume has pointed out, one may, for instance,
also acquire property by a payment (‘‘fortune’’) (Hume
1978 [1739], p. 489).
Virtual items in the virtual world of an online multi-
player computer game can be brought under the afore-
mentioned definition of property. They are allocated to a
particular player of the game, to the exclusion of other
players, when they are accessible only through the owner’s
account with a password and username. The past event of
appropriation that established a particular player of an
online multiplayer computer game as the owner of a virtual
item can consist of the effort that was put into acquiring it.
In the virtual world of RuneScape, for instance, players can
purchase items, such as a virtual mask and a virtual amulet,
by the performance of certain tasks (http://www.runescape.
com). The past event of appropriation can also consist of a
payment. In the virtual world of Habbo, for instance,
players can purchase virtual furniture with ‘‘credits’’,
which they can buy with real, non-virtual money (http://
www.habbo.nl; http://www.habbo.com).
In sum, virtual items in the virtual world of an online
multiplayer computer game can count as a particular player’s
property in the non-virtual world. Can they also represent
value in the non-virtual world? In order to determine the real,
non-virtual value of a virtual item we have to go back to what
defined it as property. That is because the value that virtual
property represents in the non-virtual world is related to the
nature of the event of appropriation by which a person has
established him- or herself as the owner.
If a player really needs to pay in order to purchase a
virtual item in the virtual world of an online multiplayer
computer game, this virtual item represents pecuniary
value in the non-virtual world (Rijna 2010, pp. 792–793).
As a matter of fact, most things that count as property in
the non-virtual world are of pecuniary value. As was
established in the last section, the key harm that is caused
by theft is pecuniary loss.
Virtual items that cannot be purchased by a payment,
but only by effort, such as the virtual mask and the virtual
amulet that were at stake in the RuneScape case, cannot
represent pecuniary value in the non-virtual world. But
they can represent another type of value, which is not
conducive to wealth, but to another aspect of well-being.
According to Mooradian hedonism is the philosophical
theory of well-being that best explains (non-pecuniary)
value attributions to virtual entities (2006, p. 688). Hedo-
nism claims that all and only pleasure has value and all and
only pain has disvalue for well-being. Both pleasure and
pain are understood broadly. Pleasure is taken to include all
pleasant experience; pain is taken to include all unpleasant
experience (Moore 2004, introduction). Thus, hedonism
argues that the constituents of (dis)value are (un)pleasant
sensations, feelings and emotions (Mooradian 2006,
p. 688).
There are several hedonist accounts of the level or
amount of pleasure’s value. Bentham claimed, for instance,
that the amount of value varies with pleasure’s quantitative
features: its duration, intensity or strength (as summarized
by Moore 2004, § 2). Mill thought that the amount of value
varies with pleasure’s quality; he thought that there are
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures (as summarized by Moore
2004, § 2). In sum, hedonism reduces value judgments to
judgments about ‘‘the qualities of sensations and feelings
as well as the probability and frequency of their occu-
rence, among other things’’ (Mooradian 2006, p. 688).
The virtual entities that we encounter in the virtual worlds
of online multiplayer computer games cannot provide for
sensory pleasures or pains, however. Therefore, their value
cannot be explained in ordinary hedonistic terms. As Søraker
points out, it is a special kind of hedonism that can explain the
value of virtual entities: ‘‘Confidence Adjusted Intrinsic
Attitudinal Hedonism (CAIAH)’’ (2010, p. 191). CAIAH
assumes that well-being is not enhanced or reduced by sen-
sory pleasures or pains, but by attitudinal pleasures or pains.
It is not about physical pleasure or pain, but about the plea-
sure or pain one takes in something (e.g. if one enjoys playing
a computer game). The more confident one is about the
pleasure or pain one takes in something, the more conducive
or detrimental it is to well-being (Søraker 2010,
pp. 191–192).
Media effects studies show that (online multiplayer)
computer games elicit real emotions in the non-virtual
world (e.g. Ja¨rvinen 2009, p. 86). Players take pleasure or
pain in gameplay. According to Ja¨rvinen the pleasures or
pains that are triggered by gameplay are mainly ‘‘prospect-
based emotions’’: they are fundamentally related to the
goals the game imposes on the players and with which they
identify (2009, p. 90). A player can, for instance, become
frustrated if s/he does not reach the next level of the game
(hedonistic disvalue) and happy if s/he does (hedonistic
value). The intensity of these emotions depends on the
degree to which the player is ‘‘immersed’’ or ‘‘engaged’’ in
the game world (Ibid., p. 92).
Not only events, but also items in the virtual world of an
(online multiplayer) computer game can embody prospect-
based emotions. Ja¨rvinen states:
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A tool that the player can use to her advantage in
order to reach the goal (…), represents an object that
embodies the solution to the challenge that the goal
represents. The object communicates a prospect for
the player, and thus, such an instrumental object, and
its use, is bound to elicit emotions.
(Ja¨rvinen 2009, pp. 99–100).
This can be illustrated as follows. In the virtual world of
RuneScape players can develop their abilities in a number
of skills, such as fishing, woodcutting or crafting, at dif-
ferent levels. Some of their talents they can use to create
items which they can sell to other players. Other talents
they can use to perform tasks. By the performance of tasks
players can obtain items and points. The richer a player
becomes and the more points and items s/he possesses, the
more powerful s/he becomes in the game (http://www.
runescape.com). So virtual items in the virtual world of
RuneScape communicate a prospect for the player: the
more of these items s/he possessess, the closer s/he comes
to the goal that RuneScape imposes on its players: to
become the most powerful player of the game.
Thus, virtual items in the virtual world of an online
multiplayer computer game that are purchased by effort
can represent hedonistic value in the non-virtual world if
they are tools that the player can use to his or her advantage
in order to reach the goal of the game. The (amount of)
hedonistic value that a virtual item represents in the non-
virtual world, differs from player to player and item to item
however. As was established earlier, it depends on the
degree to which the player is ‘‘immersed’’ or ‘‘engaged’’ in
the game world, how intense the emotions are that the
gameplay elicits. The more confident a player is about the
pleasure s/he takes in the gameplay, the more pleased s/he
is if s/he reaches the goal that the computer game imposes
on its players and the more hedonistic value a virtual item
that can be used for this represents. Of course, the amount
of hedonistic value that a virtual item represents also
depends on how conducive that particular item is to
reaching the goal of the computer game.
In conclusion, virtual items in the virtual world of an
online multiplayer computer game can count as a particular
player’s property in the non-virtual world. They can also
represent (pecuniary or hedonistic) value in the non-virtual
world. If they do it makes sense, from a moral point of
view, to bring the act of stealing them under the prohibition
on theft and to count these virtual items, thereby, as req-
uisite objects of theft (objects that can be stolen).1
Conclusion
In this paper I have studied both the ontological question
whether or not virtual items are ‘‘objects’’ that can be ‘‘sto-
len’’ and the moral question whether or not they should count
as such. I have argued that the act of stealing in the virtual
world of an online multiplayer computer game can be seen as
a ‘‘real institutional activity’’ and virtual items as ‘‘requisite
objects’’ if they have the features that make it sensible to see
them as such. Applying Searle’s constitutive rule, it can be
said, then, that the act of stealing virtual items in the virtual
world of an online multiplayer computer game (X) counts as
theft (Y) in the non-virtual world (C). Thereby, it is admitted
that virtual items (X), count as ‘‘objects that can be stolen’’
(Y) in the non-virtual world (C). I went on to argue that it also
makes sense, from a moral point of view, to count them as
such under the following conditions.
An act of stealing in the virtual world of an online multi-
player computer game is to be governed by the rules of the
game, unless the ‘‘magic circle’’ (a metaphorical line between
the fantasy realms of computer games and the non-virtual
world) is crossed. The metaphorical line of the magic circle is
crossed if the act of stealing constitutes such a grave violation
of the rules of the online multiplayer computer game that
they do not provide an adequate punishment or if the act of
stealing is performed outside the setting of the game, for
instance when it involves an out of the game infraction, such
as deceit or violence in the non-virtual world. The act of
stealing can be brought under the scope of criminal law, then,
if it is harmful to others (John Stuart Mill’s ‘‘harm principle’’).
An act of stealing in the virtual world of an online multiplayer
computer game harms another player, in the sense that the
other player is worse off in a way which affects his or her well-
being, if the object(s) stolen is/are this other player’s valuable
property in the non-virtual world. Here the questions whether
it makes sense to count the act of stealing in the virtual world
of an online multiplayer computer game as theft and virtual
items as objects that can be stolen in the non-virtual world,
become intertwined.
Virtual items can be considered a particular player’s
property in the non-virtual world if they are allocated to
this particular player, to the exclusion of others. A virtual
item is allocated to a particular player if some past event of
appropriation has established that player as the owner.
1 An anonymous reviewer suggested the following case as a
challenge to the view I present here. In the virtual worlds of certain
online multiplayer computer games players can own tools that could
be considered illegal in the non-virtual world, e.g. weapons or other
tools for violence. Should they count as objects that can be stolen? I
Footnote 1 continued
do not think that the (legal) status of the real, non-virtual equivalent of
a virtual item is of importance for the question whether or not it
should count as an object that can be stolen. The real, non-virtual
equivalent of a virtual item might be illegal; there also might not be a
real, non-virtual equivalent of the virtual item (if it is fictitious, e.g. a
magic potion). As long as a virtual item can be considered property
worthy of (pecuniary or hedonistic) value in the non-virtual world, it
should count as an object that can be stolen.
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The past event of appropriation can, for instance, consist of
a payment or of the effort that has been put into acquiring
the virtual item. The value that virtual items represent in
the non-virtual world is related to the nature of the event of
appropriation by which a player has established him- or
herself as the owner. If a player really needs to pay in order
to purchase a virtual item in the virtual world of an online
multiplayer computer game, this virtual item represents
pecuniary value in the non-virtual world. If the virtual item
is acquired by effort, it can represent hedonistic value in
the non-virtual world. The constituents of hedonistic value
are pleasant emotions. Virtual items can elicit pleasant
emotions if they are tools that the player can use to his or
her advantage in order to reach the goal of the game. The
intensity of the pleasant emotions a virtual item elicits and
thus the amount of hedonistic value it represents, depend
on the degree to which the player is ‘‘immersed’’ or
‘‘engaged’’ in the virtual world of the online multiplayer
computer game. The amount of hedonistic value that a
virtual item represents also depends on how conducive the
particular item is to reach the goal that the game imposes.
In conclusion, it makes sense to count the act of stealing
virtual items in the virtual world of an online multiplayer
computer game as theft and, thereby, virtual items as
‘‘objects’’ that can be ‘‘stolen’’ if these virtual items can be
considered property with (pecuniary or hedonistic) value in
the non-virtual world. I am aware that this conclusion
raises other questions. How should we deal with the
jurisdictional problems if a player in one country steals a
virtual item from a player in another country in the virtual
world of an online multiplayer computer game? How
should we ‘‘measure’’ the amount of hedonistic value that a
particular virtual item represents for a particular player?
Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this
paper, however. The issue of theft of virtual items in the
virtual worlds of online multiplayer computer games is in
need of further discussion and analysis from academics not
only in the field of computer ethics, but also in the
respective fields of law and psychology.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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